An internal IDF investigation revealed that false assumptions and outdated strategies adopted by Israel’s military and security officials made the border communities vulnerable to Hamas’s invasion on October 7th.

Announcing the findings, the Israeli military stated, “The IDF failed in its mission to protect people,” calling it “one of the greatest failures” in the military’s history.

A major factor in the failure was the assumption that Hamas’s primary focus was underground warfare in tunnels rather than a ground invasion.

When Yahya Sinwar took control of the terror group in 2017, he shifted its strategy toward ground combat, but Israel’s security establishment was unaware of the change.

Another incorrect assumption was that Hamas was a “rational organization” that had been deterred from full-scale conflict following the 2014 Gaza war and Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021.

Instead of being deterred, Hamas realized in 2021 that it could successfully launch missiles against Jerusalem and wage a multi-front war, with Hezbollah’s help, against Israel.

Israel’s military also mistakenly believed that, starting in 2017, Hamas was primarily focused on civil development and had no intention of challenging Israel.

Even as the Hamas leaders planned the invasion and trained their terror army for years, Israel’s military assumed their focus was on tunnels.

A troubling finding in the investigation revealed that, despite Israel obtaining the “Wall of Jericho” document—Hamas’ attack plan, which was accessed in 2022 and detailed a strategy to flood Israel with thousands of terrorists and invade border and central communities—the military dismissed it as a “future plan” rather than an imminent threat.

Additionally, the IDF redirected resources from the Gaza border to Judea, Samaria, and northern areas, leaving the Gaza border vulnerable prior to the attack on October 7, 2023.

Image - Cars outside the Nova music festival set on fire during the October 7th invasion. (Yoav Dudkevitch/TPS)