THE NUMBERS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

Russia has launched approximately 15,000 Shahad-136 and Gran-2 (a Russian copy) drones. Out of these, only 454 successfully hit their targets. That means a staggering 97% failed to reach their intended mark. Breaking it down:

- 9,051 were intercepted and destroyed by Ukrainian air defense systems.
- 5,506 either malfunctioned, missed their targets, or were disrupted by electronic warfare.

This means that only 3% of these drones have actually hit their targets, an abysmally low success rate for a weapon system meant for precision strikes.

THE COMPLICATION OF DECOY DRONES

In recent months, Russia has complicated the assessment of these figures by integrating decoy drones such as Gerbera and Parody into their attacks. These decoys mimic the radar signature of the Shahad-136 and are launched alongside them. As a result, it is likely that some of the reported intercepts and misses include these decoy drones. However, the Shahad-136 remains the primary attack drone, meaning the data is still largely reliable.

THE COST OF INEFFICIENCY

Assuming the available data is accurate, using the Shahad-136 as a precision strike weapon is highly inefficient. To achieve a 90% probability of hitting a target, Russia would need to launch approximately 76 drones per target.

Each Shahad-136 is estimated to cost between $150,000 and $250,000. This means that hitting a single target with a high probability would cost around $11.4 million or more—a cost comparable to that of advanced hypersonic missiles. This reality contradicts the image of the Shahad-136 as an inexpensive and effective weapon. In reality, it is more akin to a suicide UAV with good public relations.

WHAT MAKES A SUICIDE DRONE EFFECTIVE?

For a long-range suicide drone to be a valuable attack tool, it must meet several key criteria:

1. Accuracy – It must reliably hit intended targets.
2. Survivability – It must evade enemy defenses.
3. Mechanical Reliability – It must function without frequent malfunctions.

Even Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has admitted that accuracy is a critical factor for a drone’s effectiveness. Yet, the Shahad-136 continues to fail in this regard.

IF IT'S SO INEFFECTIVE, WHY ARE COUNTRIES STILL BUYING IT?

The simple answer: FOMO (fear of missing out). Many nations are acquiring the Shahad-136 and similar drones due to the hype surrounding their use in modern warfare. However, there is an alternative value to their deployment.

THE SHAHAD-136 AS A WEAPON OF ATTRITION

While the drone is not effective at destroying high-value targets, it does serve another purpose: attrition warfare. Since February 2025, the average daily Shahad-136 attacks in Ukraine have risen to 140 launches per day, a stark increase from the 60 daily launches recorded between August 2024 and January 2025. On February 23, 2025, Russia launched a record-breaking 267 drones in a single day.

This level of sustained drone attacks forces Ukraine to constantly deploy air defense systems, keeping them operational 24/7. The Ukrainian military must:

- Deploy thousands of anti-aircraft guns for protection.
- Fire expensive anti-aircraft missiles at relatively cheap drones.
- Scramble helicopters and fighter jets to intercept incoming threats.

This puts an enormous strain on Ukrainian defenses, stretching their resources thin over time. The Shahad-136, then, is not a weapon designed to destroy targets—it is a weapon designed to exhaust the enemy. This is its true purpose in the battlefield.

CONCLUSION

The Shahad-136 is not an effective precision strike weapon. Its poor accuracy, high failure rate, and mechanical unreliability make it a terrible choice for targeted attacks. However, it excels in one area: attrition warfare. By overwhelming enemy defenses with sheer numbers, it forces adversaries to waste valuable resources defending against a relatively low-cost threat. This, in itself, makes it a valuable tool in modern warfare—but not in the way its creators originally intended.