The IDF’s investigation into the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas-led onslaught reveals a complex picture of decision-making and response under unprecedented circumstances.

While Maj. Gen. Shlomi Binder, now head of the Intelligence Directorate (then a brigadier general commanding the Operations Division, the core unit of the IDF Operations Directorate), is credited with making correct decisions during the crisis, questions remain about the critical hours leading up to the attack and the army’s overall preparedness for such a massive infiltration.

The investigation examining the IDF Operations Division’s actions during the events of Oct. 7 concluded that Binder made correct decisions, acted calmly and utilized all resources at his disposal.

However, this comprehensive investigation, based on footage and recordings from the “Pit” (the IDF’s underground command center in Tel Aviv), only begins at 6:29 a.m., when the attack began.

What happened the night before the attack was not examined with the same level of detail, but only as part of a general investigation conducted by a senior officer in the Operations Directorate.

It is worth noting that Binder’s appointment as head of the Intelligence Directorate during the war faced sharp criticism both within and outside the army.

IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi was accused of promoting a close associate and confidant who was head of the Operations Division on the morning of the massacre. Halevi claimed that initial findings from the investigation into the Operations Division did not prevent the appointment. However, as mentioned, the fact that the investigation looks at the events starting after the war was launched at 6:29 a.m. may skew the picture.

The investigations conducted so far reveal that Binder was not familiar with the “Jericho Wall” plan for a case of mass infiltration by terrorists. The most dangerous scenario he prepared for, based on intelligence assessments, was rocket fire and targeted infiltrations.

At 2:30 a.m., Binder received the first information about an unusual occurrence—from the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) and not from a Military Intelligence source or the Southern Command. Although the information did not indicate issuing an immediate warning, Binder held a series of conversations with his subordinates and with Air Force and Navy officers.

At 4:30 a.m., a situation assessment was conducted by the head of the Operations Directorate and the chief of staff, which was brought forward from the planned morning assessment. As a result, Binder sent the head of the Operations Division’s Southern Arena (a lieutenant colonel) to IDF headquarters to prepare a situation assessment.

However, despite the accumulating intelligence signs, Binder did not conduct a comprehensive situation assessment that night. In military jargon, no “immediacy” was identified for a warning concerning the Gaza Strip. A more comprehensive situation assessment and consultations in the Intelligence Directorate might have led to a different conclusion.

One of the central claims concerns Binder’s late arrival at the command center in Tel Aviv. According to the main points of the investigation obtained by Israel Hayom, he was caught on camera entering the Supreme Command Post only at 8:47 a.m., more than two hours after the terrorist onslaught began.

The explanation given in the investigation is that Binder lives in the Golan Heights, and from time to time he had to delay his arrival to give orders, as cellular reception on the way was disrupted. The investigation determined that his decision in this context was reasonable.

According to the investigation, when the attack began at 6:29 a.m., the Tel Aviv command center was only at basic readiness. Despite reports of a shortage of forces in the Gaza Division, the investigation found that in practice, there was one more company than the required standard in the sector.

While one can argue whether the order of forces was appropriate, there was no shortage of forces on the ground. Following a barrage of rockets that preceded the start of the Hamas invasion, the Operations Division put nearby forces on high alert: These included special units and several battalions, including a Givati infantry battalion, Battalion 450 of the NCO School and the Gefen Battalion of Training Base 1.

At 6:36 a.m., a conversation took place involving (among others) the chief of staff, the head of the Operations Directorate, the Israeli Air Force commander and the head of Southern Command, when it was decided to activate the army in the broadest possible manner. By 7:30 a.m., all regular army forces and some reserve forces were activated.

The investigation, based on real-time cameras from the command center, shows that the television screens were operational, and there was no significant gap between the OSINT (open-source intelligence) situation picture and the information at the HQ.

The so-called Hannibal Directive—the emergency order in the case of hostile infiltration—moved up the chain of command: The Gaza Division declared it at 6:37 a.m., Southern Command at 6:43 a.m., and the Tel Aviv command center at 6:48 a.m. The order gives the sector commander all the authority to deal with the infiltration, including activating air power and special units.

Reports continued to multiply: At 7:10 a.m., Southern Command reported eight infiltrations, and by 7:30 a.m., 15 infiltrations along the Gaza Strip were already known. Later, dozens more infiltrations were recorded, some reported and some not.

A few minutes after the attack began, a continuous video stream was opened between Southern Command and the command center, where they also watched footage from additional sources.

At 6:55 a.m., the head of the Southern Arena identified a sea infiltration and updated Southern Command’s operations officer, who reported to the division. In the first minutes, the chief of staff was heard reporting on the infiltration of paragliders after the then-commander of the 146th Division, Brig. Gen. Israel Shomer, a resident of Kibbutz Kfar Aza, witnessed it.

One of the central questions regarding the functioning of the Operations Division concerns the manner of allocating forces to dozens of event locations. The investigation reveals that the Gaza Division, Southern Command and the General Staff’s command center struggled to form an accurate picture of the situation, partly because the reports of infiltrations seemed identical.

According to the investigation, by 7:30 a.m., the Operations Division had activated all available forces. The General Staff allocated forces to Southern Command according to an orderly chain of command. The regional command and the division were responsible for sending forces to various points.

Around 8 a.m., after the chief of staff’s situation assessment, the head of the Operations Directorate, Maj. Gen. Oded Basyuk, entered the command pit and ordered the transition to war. He released all remaining restrictions and approved reserve mobilization. At 9:07 a.m., the Operations Division activated the “Gal” (National Mobilization) system—even before approval by the political echelon.

To the significant question—why the forces didn’t arrive faster, the investigation found that there were physical constraints of time, organization and travel. Most forces arrived between 9:30 and 10 a.m.

The arrival, according to the investigation, was indeed not fast enough, but the IDF wasn’t prepared for a scenario of hundreds and thousands of terrorists infiltrating simultaneously at dozens of points, and assumed there would be a warning allowing appropriate preparation of the order of battle.

The investigation also answers the question “Where was the army?” The answer is simple—the IDF got stuck in Sderot. The forces that arrived in the south positioned themselves in the towns of Ofakim and Sderot for several reasons: The apparent situation, influenced among other things by the video of an armed Hamas pickup truck in Sderot—indicated fighting in the city.

Many soldiers were directed there despite Kibbutz Nirim, for example, being invaded by 10 times more terrorists. The assessment was that the potential for damage was greater in cities, with their greater populations. Additionally, Sderot constituted a geographical bottleneck that delayed the forces’ advancement southward until almost 11 a.m.

Painfully, forces were sent to places that managed to “cry out” louder for help. To Nirim, for example, forces arrived only after the last terrorist had left. As for the massacre at the Supernova music festival, the army didn’t understand the magnitude of the catastrophe until a late stage.

The investigation also examined why the General Staff didn’t intervene more in the issue of force allocation, despite the catastrophic and chaotic situation. The main answer lies in the IDF’s command structure: Southern Command was functioning, and the Gaza Division under Brig. Gen. Avi Rosenfeld projected control of the situation, despite actually collapsing.

In such a situation, according to the investigation, and considering the need to prepare for other fronts (mainly in the north), there was no justification for excessive intervention by the General Staff. Deviation from the rules of command and control, it is argued, would have created chaos.

Nevertheless, there were cases where the General Staff did intervene, but did so in cooperation with the Southern Command, not over its head. In one case, for example, it can be seen that Binder, the head of the Operations Division, directed forces and commanders to communities together with the Southern Command’s operations officer.

Despite the cruel and painful result of the massacre, the investigation determines that under the existing alert conditions and in the absence of intelligence warning, the conduct in the General Staff’s command center was generally good.

However, areas for improvement were identified: better formulation of the situation picture, better utilization of multi-organizational capabilities (Shin Bet, Mossad and other organizations that were present), faster activation of forces, and maintaining a rapid readiness array including transportation systems and helicopters.

However, the question arises whether the chosen investigation methodology is correct. The separation between night events and day events raises doubts, as decisions, or their absence, during the night substantially affected the day’s events and the ability to prevent or reduce the catastrophe. An investigation of the Operations Division starting at 6:29 a.m. cannot be complete without an examination of its conduct during the preceding night.

The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit responded with the following statement: “The IDF is in the midst of the operational debriefing process of the events of Oct. 7 and what preceded them. The details presented in the article do not constitute the official summary of the investigation. The investigation has not yet been concluded, and when it is, it will be presented transparently to the public.”

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