1. In short, it can be said that the roots of the collapse of the resistance axis that we have experienced in the past year can be seen in the assassination of Soleimani, and we can assess how significant the assassination was by looking at the state of the axis today.

2. When looking at Israel's assassination policy in the Middle East, it is often claimed (rightly) that for every assassinated person there is a replacement, and few assassinations are significant for a long period of time. Today it is clear that the assassination of Soleimani is definitely of the second type, and the decision made by President Trump changed the Middle East in general and Iran's influence in this region in particular.

3. One thing is clear - no one can step into Soleimani's shoes. His successor, Qaani, not only failed to fill his place, but mainly failed in his central role - to allow Iran to control and direct its proxies in the Middle East. Qaani's weakness forced Nasrallah to take a more significant role in directing the proxies, in a way that may have also harmed Hezbollah itself.

4. It is very difficult to assume that Sinwar would have decided to carry out the October 7 attack without Soleimani being aware of it and certainly without him preparing the axis for this attack. The surprise experienced by the other elements of the axis following the Hamas attack led to the construction of a confused, incoherent strategy that deeply failed to exploit Hamas's operational success.

5. Moreover, the degree of independence we saw from the axis elements (certainly the Houthis, but also the Shiite militias in Iraq and even Hezbollah) was limited as long as Soleimani was alive. Without Soleimani (and with the elimination of Mahdavi), the connection between Hezbollah and Iran was significantly damaged, and most importantly, Nasrallah’s ability to consult with a figure like Soleimani and better understand the mindset of the Iranian leader was damaged.

6. The Iranian leadership lost its greatest expert on Middle Eastern affairs, precisely at a time when it needed him more than ever. The leadership in Tehran is still paying for the degree of disconnection and lack of understanding of what is happening in the Middle East in general and in relation to Israel in particular, with a series of erroneous decisions stemming from a lack of familiarity with the balance of power in the region that led Iran to a serious strategic predicament, which is also the result of decisions made by Iranian proxies without coordination with it.

7. The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria is yet another side effect of the elimination of Soleimani, who was the only factor that could have integrated the efforts of Russia, Hezbollah, and those Shiite elements in Syria to save Assad. Of course, it is difficult to know what would have happened if Soleimani had been alive, but it is clear today that there would be no substitute for his ability to coordinate efforts to defend the Syrian regime.

8. Looking ahead – Iran will have a very difficult time rebuilding Hezbollah’s capacity without Soleimani. After the Second Lebanon War, it was Soleimani who led, together with Nasrallah, the effort to transform Hezbollah from a terrorist organization into a terrorist army with strategic capabilities, but now, without Soleimani and Nasrallah and certainly with the loss of Syria to the axis, the ability to rebuild Hezbollah will be much more limited.

CONCLUSION

The bottom line is that Soleimani's strength and dominance in building the axis, his leadership, and his close coordination with Hezbollah and Nasrallah were detrimental to his elimination, as no one could have stepped into his shoes. 

The "dispersion" of the axis and the strengthening of its various elements led to the weakening of Iranian influence over the various components of the axis, in a way that deeply complicated Iran. As long as there was no major campaign, the consequences of Soleimani's elimination could have been "disguised." 

As soon as the war broke out, his absence was deeply felt and severely damaged the axis' coordination, Nasrallah's ability to maintain a channel of communication with the leadership in Tehran and rely on Soleimani, and even Iran's ability to understand what was happening in the Middle East.