Against the background of Hamas’s ongoing war with Israel (and the expressions of support for it among Palestinians and Islamists in Jordan), the Iranian regime has intensified its efforts to subvert the Hashemite monarchy.

The arrests by Amman in March this year of Iranian agents involved in smuggling arms to Muslim Brotherhood elements in Jordan are part of a campaign to counter the role of Tehran in bringing both drugs and weapons over the Syrian and Iraqi borders into Jordan.

Tensions rose further over Jordan’s supportive role in foiling the Iranian attack on Israel on April 14.

For the Iranian regime, the destabilization of Jordan is a vital precursor to achieving the strategic goal of turning Judea and Samaria into “another Gaza,” as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei suggested back in 2014—hence the importance of U.S. and Israeli support for Jordan.

The stability of the kingdom (and thus the need to reduce economic and social strains) is a vital interest of both Israel and the West.

 Iran’s stance towards destabilization in Jordan

Back in November 2014, following the IDF’s “Operation Protective Edge” in Gaza, Khamenei published a tweet explaining, in nine questions and answers, why and how Israel (“the fake Zionist regime”) would be eliminated.

In answer to Question Seven—”What is the most urgent action to take for militarily confront Israel” (the lame English is his)—he wrote: “The West Bank should be armed like Gaza and those who are interested in Palestine’s destiny [i.e., Iran] should take action to arm the people of the West Bank so that the sorrows and griefs of the Palestinian people will reduce in the light of their powerful hands and the weakness of the Zionist enemy.”

Clearly, for this plan to be fulfilled, access to the West Bank must be established, similar to the extensive smuggling operations established under the Gaza border with Egypt over the years.

Due to the terrain and the professional abilities of the Jordanian security forces, this cannot be easily achieved in any degree approaching the situation that prevailed in Gaza before Oct. 7 unless the overall stability and governmental capacity of the Hashemite Kingdom are overwhelmed.

Only through the creation of an active base of support in Jordan can the situation in Judea and Samaria (where the people, as Khamenei pointed out in answer to Question Nine, have “only stones” in their hands) be transformed to bring about Israel’s destruction.

Nearly 10 years later, and against the background of a multi-front war led by Iran, the supreme leader’s design seems to be progressing. The Islamic Republic’s proxy organization Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a prominent element in the northern parts of Samaria (mainly Nablus and Jenin). Across the river in Jordan, it has apparently been cultivating relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, encouraging escalating protests against the presence of an Israeli Embassy in Amman. This raises questions about the ability of the regime to restrain the growing anger as the war goes on.

Cross-border smuggling: Drugs and weapons

Most significantly, as the March arrests indicate, the Iranian regime and the proxies and allies working for it on Syrian soil are actively engaged in organizing traffic across the long and relatively porous Syrian border with Jordan. This frontier is liable to become a crucial point of tension as Jordanian authorities seek to stem a flood of drugs and weapons aimed at destabilizing Jordanian society.

Since early 2022, it has become increasingly clear that state interests are involved in generating a steady flow of Captagon (Fenethylline), the synthetic “jihad drug,” from Syria (identified as a key center of production) into Jordan and through it to the Gulf.

In June 2024, a massive haul was foiled on its way to Saudi Arabia. The regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad takes its cut, a significant source of income for him amid the ruin brought about by Syria’s civil war.

But the key player behind the smuggling networks is Iran, and the escalating violence—in 2022 alone, Jordanian security forces killed at least 35 smugglers, and in May 2023 they attacked a key drug “boss” and his family in a raid inside Syria—serves Tehran’s strategic purposes as well as generating billions of dollars in illicit income.

Alongside drugs, the channels leading into Jordan enable Iran (and Hezbollah, according to Jordanian sources) to run guns and explosives meant for either Iran’s proxies in Judea and Samaria, mainly PIJ, or subversive elements in Jordan itself.

Subversive agents seek to translate the anger and frustrations of Jordan’s Palestinian population, in the face of the images coming out of Gaza, into active protests and the delegitimization of the Hashemite regime. While the Jordanian Intelligence Department (JID) has shown a remarkable capacity to deal with domestic threats, the current challenges may well be the most severe in recent years.

The Iranian regime now has all the more reason to seek the destabilization of the Hashemite Kingdom. While never officially acknowledged, Jordan’s role in supporting the joint effort to foil Iran’s drone, cruise and ballistic missile attack on Israel is well known—many of the incoming threats were intercepted in Jordan’s airspace.

As one of America’s most consistent partners in the region (except for a period of affiliation with Saddam Hussein during the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991), Jordan is viewed in Tehran not only as a physical barrier on the road to the West Bank but also as a sworn ideological and strategic enemy.

What should Israel (and the United States) do?

 Many aspects of Jordan’s behavior irritate and anger Israelis (and Americans)—ranging from its voting patterns at the U.N. General Assembly to giving shelter to murderous terrorists and the harassment of Orthodox Jews at border crossings into the country.

Discreet ways should and can be found, from a position of friendship, to raise these issues with the Jordanian authorities at the appropriate moment. But at this delicate and decisive point in time, it is of the highest importance to focus on lending support to the Jordanian authorities as they face up to Iran’s campaign of subversion.

At the level of intelligence cooperation, all efforts should be made to monitor, and where possible jointly foil, Iran’s efforts to run munitions, drugs and subversive elements into Jordan. As indicated above, the Jordanian security forces are quite willing to use force when necessary—what JID and the Jordanian leadership need is to be on constant alert against inventive Iranian and Hezbollah methods.

At the same time, Iran should be denied opportunities to “fish in muddy waters.” Where possible, Jordan should be supported in economic terms with generous arrangements for the supply of gas and water from Israel. Given Jordan’s limitations, U.S. aid must remain a mainstay of the regime’s ability to use its policies to reduce social tensions.

This, in turn, requires Israel to mobilize its base of support in Congress to aid Jordan and to raise awareness of the issue and its implications. Ultimately, it should be made clear that now as in 1970 when Amman confronted the PLO, Israel cannot accept hostile control of Jordan—with all that such a warning could imply, particularly if backed by a firm American message.