As we began our Zoom call, John Spencer made a statement that should resonate globally. “Everything that the world has heard about Gaza has actually been counterfactual. It has been wrong. What Israel has done to protect civilians, and despite what Hamas has wanted, has been an amazing achievement that I didn’t even, personally as an urban warfare scholar, think was possible.”

Maj. John Spencer speaks from extensive experience. After a long combat career in the U.S. Army, including two tours in Iraq as both soldier and commander, he emerged as one of the world’s foremost experts in urban warfare. Many consider him the top authority in the field.

Currently, he leads the Urban Warfare Studies at the United States Military Academy at West Point, regularly advising top brass in the U.S. military and other armies. Spencer also co-founded the “International Working Group on Subterranean Warfare” and has authored three books in these fields.

This week, he visits Israel for the annual Shabtai Shavit International Conference, held Oct. 6-7, organized by the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at Reichman University. Among the speakers is Dr. Daphne Richmond-Barak, another subterranean warfare expert, who warns about Hezbollah’s capabilities in this domain. This marks Spencer’s fourth visit to Israel since the war’s onset. During his previous three visits, the IDF facilitated his entry into the Gaza Strip. What he witnessed there left a strong impression.

According to Spencer, the war Israel has waged since Oct. 7 defies comparison to any previous military conflict.

“I wrote an article explaining that it’s like comparing apples to oranges,” Spencer said. The IDF’s achievements in Gaza, and the series of blows against Hamas in recent weeks, led him to conclude that, as in the past, Israel has once again demonstrated resilience and recovered from a devastating initial attack.

“Israel has once again proven that when attacked, it can achieve the impossible. Its actions in Gaza since Oct. 7, despite Hamas’s 15 years of fortification and preparation, 385 miles of tunnels, a strategy of human shields, the hostage crisis and simultaneous attacks from Hezbollah, Iran, and the Houthis are unprecedented. No other army in the world has done this, and I believe none is capable of it. Some might interpret this as Israeli weakness. As a military analyst, I see it as a testament to Israel’s unique capabilities.”

He added, “I acknowledge Hamas’s planning for Oct. 7 was likely supported by another state. But the attack wasn’t worse only because the Israelis have been fighting back ever since.”

‘They only respond to force‘

We’ll return to comparisons later. As we speak on Sunday evening, Israel is already engaged in an operation to dismantle Hezbollah’s missile arrays. Spencer is impressed but cautions that a war in Lebanon would differ significantly from that in Gaza.

Q: How do you assess the IDF’s performance in Lebanon at this juncture?

A: Until a week ago, the thousands of rockets fired by Hezbollah signaled a failure of Israeli deterrence. In the past week, with the pager attack [attributed to Israel] and the strike on Hezbollah’s leadership, we’re seeing Israel clearly say, ‘enough.’ The north has been evacuated for 11 months. 80,000 Israelis, as you know better than I do, can’t return home. This situation can’t persist. So we’re witnessing Israel, particularly through its air force, rebuilding the necessary deterrence to achieve de-escalation and compel Hezbollah to cease fire. Israel and the international community have exhausted diplomatic channels, but sometimes terrorists only respond to force.

Q: Will this use of force bring Hezbollah to halt its attacks? They’re currently saying, “Despite your strikes, we’ll continue fighting.”

A: Positive. I view Hezbollah as a rational actor, a prized asset of the Iranian regime that doesn’t act without Tehran’s approval. They want to survive, and Israel is sending clear messages: “Stop or face destruction.” Tactically and operationally, it would be challenging for Israel to follow through, but deterrence works when you have both capability and demonstrated will. Until now, Hezbollah and Iran doubted Israel’s resolve to destroy Hezbollah. They sought to maintain their strategic assets while testing Israel’s limits.

But we’re seeing a shift. Israel is demonstrating not just capability, but willingness to act. This week’s attacks present Hezbollah with a stark choice about their survival. Of course, a ground invasion to push Hezbollah back would come at a cost. But Israel is showing it’s prepared to pay that price if necessary.

Q: Should Israel explicitly threaten to destroy Hezbollah, as it did with Hamas? We haven’t heard such a statement regarding Hezbollah.

A: That’s a good point. Israel needs to signal its readiness without explicit statements. An outright threat could prompt Iran to escalate its involvement and directly attack Israel. You’re right; it’s a delicate geopolitical balance where words carry significant weight.

Q: Is a ground offensive in Lebanon necessary to achieve Israel’s objectives? 

A: Not necessarily. Hezbollah could decide to cease attacks tomorrow. A ground operation would be challenging, and its necessity depends on how political leaders define the military objectives. Southern Lebanon presents formidable military challenges. It’s known as “the land of tunnels.” We must consider the military hurdles, Hezbollah’s size and the Radwan forces. But there are also key differences. We shouldn’t expect Lebanon to mirror Gaza. It’s an entirely different operational environment.

Q: Do you believe an eventual agreement between Israel and Hezbollah is necessary?

A: Absolutely. An agreement is crucial. We could revisit the previous framework, like U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, which wasn’t effectively enforced. But for any agreement to work, Hezbollah must not only cease attacks, but needs to publicly declare an end to hostilities.

Q: The thing is, an agreement seems unlikely in the near term. Hezbollah appears intent on drawing us into a protracted conflict, as he’s been doing for nearly a year. What military options does Israel have to compel a ceasefire?

A: In my opinion, these terrorists only respond to force, which is precisely what Israel is demonstrating. As for additional measures, it’s challenging to speculate. I couldn’t have anticipated the strikes on communication devices [which Israel hasn’t claimed responsibility for], or the attack on Hezbollah’s leadership. Israel could potentially continue targeting its leadership until they conclude, “We’ve sufficiently tested Israel’s resolve. We’ve served Iran’s Islamic regime’s grand strategy adequately. It’s time to seek a settlement.” But I can’t prescribe specific actions for Israel, because Hezbollah won’t run out of rockets or fighters. However, your adversaries might exhaust their will to continue incurring losses. Ultimately, the decision lies not with Hezbollah, but with Iran’s regime. They’ll determine how much of Hezbollah can be sacrificed before deciding, “We’ve inflicted enough damage and can now stop.”

Q: How would you assess the damage Hezbollah has sustained from Israel’s actions so far?

A: Military strength isn’t just about numbers or troop count. They can promote existing commanders to replace casualties. There’s a qualitative aspect to well-trained leadership, and some of those eliminated had decades of experience. The pager operation represents a historically catastrophic blow to a terrorist organization. It’s not just about physical damage or casualty figures; the psychological impact is profound. Targeting communication devices—pagers, radios, cell phones—it’s psychologically exhausting.

From a military history perspective, Hezbollah has suffered massive damage in the past week. This was a devastatingly effective operation, perhaps more so than any previous action by Israel or others against the organization. While they may project resilience, an objective analysis reveals catastrophic damage. However, they remain highly dangerous and are striving to maintain their capabilities.

Regional implications

Oct. 7 dealt a severe blow to Israeli deterrence, a cornerstone of regional stability that had kept both adversaries and allies in check across the Middle East for decades.

Q: Has Israel’s recent actions, including the alleged pager attack, restored this deterrent image?

A: Oct. 7 was catastrophic for Israel’s regional security perception, reflecting accumulated threats and global miscalculations about the hierarchy of threats, including existential ones to Israel. But Oct. 7 has been transformative—for Israel, the Middle East and hopefully the world. The Iranian regime’s grand strategy aims to destroy Israel, and then target the United States, using proxy armies. The approach to these terrorist proxies was misguided, not just by Israel but globally. Israel’s security paradigm, internal defenses, military size, technological reliance and assumptions about Hamas’s true intentions all proved problematic. Yet, as in past crises, Israel has demonstrated its ability to achieve the seemingly impossible when attacked. Moreover, Israel’s allies have shown it doesn’t stand alone. As an American, I take pride in U.S. military efforts to intercept Iranian rockets, missiles and drones, with support from Arab nations like Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

Personally, I’m disheartened by the global disinformation campaign against Israel. It exploits very old antisemitic beliefs about Israel and its actions. But I think Israel has also demonstrated its strength through this—not just to the United States, but to many regional allies. You’ve had to navigate an incredibly complex strategic environment, unparalleled outside of Israel. Israel must fight these existential wars, yet still finds a way to achieve the unthinkable. I believe that’s what we’ve witnessed since Oct. 7. Oct. 6 can never recur in any domain.

Q: Do you think our region shares this view? In other words, do the countries that have made peace with us, and even those that haven’t, believe Israel has restored its deterrence?

A: That’s a crucial question. Whether we’re talking about proxy terrorist armies or the Islamic regime itself, I believe Israel’s strength has been proven. I think Hamas and Hezbollah expected to inflict much more damage, but Israel’s power has been displayed to the world. The question is whether the Islamic regime in Iran will change its approach.

Q: That’s precisely the question. Do you think Israel appears in Tehran’s eyes as stronger or weaker than it was on Oct. 6?

A: I believe they think they struck Israel when it was vulnerable, causing multi-year damage in many areas that Israel will need to recover from. But this also exposed Israel’s strengths. They had one opportunity. It revealed Israel’s weaknesses, but also the truth: that the U.S. doesn’t abandon Israel under direct attack from the Islamic regime, and the fact that someone eliminated a very important terrorist under the Islamic regime’s protection [Ismail Haniyeh]. So all these are signals of strength. Not absolute power. I don’t think the Iranians will abandon their strategy to destroy Israel, but they’ll need to recalculate their approach now that their cards have been exposed. So they’ll be more cautious about Israel’s strength now, but they still believe they can achieve their long-term goal.

Q: Let’s return to Lebanon. What does international law permit our soldiers to do in Southern Lebanon?

A: Well, under international law, especially Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, Israel can do what’s necessary to defend itself against attack. There’s a significant difference from Gaza, as in Lebanon there’s a place where civilians can be safely evacuated. In Gaza, due to Egypt, civilians had no exit point from the combat zone. In Lebanon, it’s different. So soldiers can operate within all the laws of war, proportionality, necessity, to do what’s needed to remove the threat that has persisted for 11 months.

The world remains hypocritical

“The international courts—the ICC and the ICJ—risk making their own true objectives very irrelevant in the international community,” Spencer said. “The reason is that both cases against Israel, especially in the International Criminal Court, lack foundation. They’re not based on any evidence—neither on field investigations nor complementary investigations. These are cases based on accusations and statements, usually relying on what we call ‘outcome-based analysis.’ That’s not how the laws of war work.”

Q: Please explain.

A: The investigation shouldn’t examine the results of military action, but rather the decisions that a military commander or leader makes in real-time, based on military necessity, or the measures taken to evacuate civilians from the area. An investigation can’t be based on numbers, certainly not on numbers and statistics from a terrorist organization, which are inaccurate. These institutions were established for genuine humanitarian goals so that individuals and nations would comply with international law, as Israel does. But they’re becoming irrelevant and undermining their own real legitimacy, because they’re deviating from the purposes for which they were established. They shouldn’t have allowed these cases to proceed at all. Everyone can have their own opinions about the number of civilians killed in Gaza, but not their own facts. This shows they’re a political organization. Therefore, the fact is they’re becoming less relevant. That’s my opinion.

Q: Their main claim, and that of others against Israel, is the allegedly high number of civilian or non-combatant casualties. They compare the war in Gaza to Mosul, for example. 

A: There’s actually no comparison. I wrote an article about that showing that that’s apples to oranges. Yes, the Battle of Mosul 2016 against ISIS was really big, the biggest battle since World War II, because just 3,000 ISIS fighters were able to hold a city for two years and prepare it for battle, whereas in Gaza, Hamas had two decades almost to prepare every inch of Gaza for war, to have the 400 miles of tunnels, to weaponize the laws of war and what’s called lawfare. There actually is no comparison, especially when they try to compare a single battle to a war. There are 10 battles of Mosul in Gaza. There are two Stalingrads there. There’s just no comparison at the scale or the intensity or the preparedness of the urban defender, which means that it’s going to take a lot to get to the urban defender who has built his entire cities for the sole purpose of war, the underground networks, the caches and buildings. I can’t find a historical example.”

Q: So what would you say to an ambassador who told me that the destruction in Gaza is worse than in Dresden in 1945?

A: Tell him to do his homework. The fact is that we dropped three or four times more on Iraq in 40 days than was dropped on Dresden. The number of civilian casualties in Dresden wasn’t known for years, so it’s just a foolish comparison, devoid of context. There were no hostages there, no requirement to enter Dresden on the ground, the objectives of that operation were different, and certainly the damage is not greater. So these are essentially more lies—damned lies.”

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